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MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:225 leaves positivism's other theses intact. Positivism's central thesis is that, whether always the case, typically the case, or the case in at least one legal system, moral justification does not supply the criteria by which a rule or principle counts as legal. 2 Instead, a society will have an overriding social practice or convergence of official behavior that, as a matter of social fact rather than moral reasoning, determines legality. 3 We can then decide what the law is without committing ourselves to a view about which decision would be morally right. 4 If legality is determined by social convention, this being mainly a uniform judicial practice, the pull is to conclude that there is widespread agreement throughout the legal system about the ground of law and the criteria of legal validity. 5 As a result, positivism has had a stake in presenting a picture of law in which theoretical disagreement is minimal.
If theoretical disagreement in law appears to occur somewhat frequently, however, this cuts in favor of a non-positivist conception that connects legal practice to moral assessments, which are typically controversial and subject to widespread disagreement. For instance, the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin viewed theoretical One reason that there are competing claims about the extent to which "theoretical disagreement" exists in law is that the term can be defined narrowly or broadly. The narrow view tends to focus on the interpretive method in constitutional or statutory disputes. For example, should a constitutional provision be interpreted based on the perceived original intent of its framers, its original meaning for citizens at the time, or as a shifting blueprint for the exercise of state power alive to contemporary values? 8 Should evaluation of an enactment be limited to its text, or account for the intent of the legislators? These controversies make up the tiniest fraction of law's practice, however vigorously they are disputed when they do arise.
This tapered construction of "theoretical disagreement" begs the question in positivism's favor. Dworkin did not see things so narrowly. He saw controversy as inhering in the argumentative 7 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016 7:56 PM
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MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:225 structure of legal practice. 9 When judges disagree in what Dworkin called "the theoretical way," these disagreements are interpretative. Judges often "disagree, in large measure or in fine detail, about the soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial practice." 10 To this point, it is difficult to deny that theoretical controversy is frequent in legal practice. Dworkin's affinity with natural law theory derived from his further claim that law's content resides in morally justified principles that practitioners should use to construe the community's legal practice in the most favorable light.
11
Some positivists have tried to reconcile the existence of theoretical disagreements in law with the commitment to a social fact-based legal theory. For instance, Scott Shapiro suggests a view of legal controversy according to which interpreters debate the point of legal practice, which is, for him, an empirical question about the political attitudes and objectives of those who "designed" the legal system. 12 Disputes about a regime's "animating ideology" are disputes about social facts, and the question becomes which methodology best harmonizes with that scheme. 13 This article similarly seeks to reconcile the existence of widespread theoretical disagreement in law with a commitment to a social fact-based legal theory. Those disagreements are not easily characterized, however, as exercises in how best to defer to the decisions of "designers" of the legal system's political objectives and divisions of labor.
14 While courts and litigants do sometimes debate 9. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the "crucial argumentative aspect of legal practice").
10. Id. at 87. But cf. Southard v. Morris, 31 Ohio Dec. 684, 687 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1913) (suggesting that the legal practitioner's duty is to argue in a way that places her client's interests in the best light, including by way of " [i] llustrations, analogies, inferences from facts proved, and in some instances, from failure to introduce proof when it appears reasonable").
11. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225; see Jules L. 593, 627 (1958) (stating an intuitively more appealing, albeit somewhat similar, view when he said that "the inclusion of the new case under the rule takes its place as a natural elaboration of the rule, as something implementing a 'purpose' which it seems natural to attribute (in some sense) to the rule itself rather than to any particular person dead or alive.").
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the original rationales for rules and statutory schemes, this sort of controversy is not particularly pervasive and does not likely account for a broader occurrence of theoretical disagreement.
15
By taking advantage of philosophical resources just recently being developed in scholarship about the logic of institutions, 16 this article provides a more compelling reason for agreeing with Dworkin that theoretical disagreement in law is widespread and rooted in law's argumentative structure, while at the same time refusing to draw the inference that morality and moral controversy engenders this widespread disagreement. 17 Law's institutional nature renders nonmoral theoretical disagreement widely possible, and frequently actual. As an institution, law must comport with, and be sustained by, institutional logic. 18 Most importantly for the purposes of this article, the sort of cooperation requisite to the initiation and maintenance of institutional reality requires that the institution in progress abide by two general constraints. The institution must (1) direct its constitutive and regulative rules at the appropriate social phenomenon, and (2) define its power relations and commitments with a sufficient level of exactness so as to render those rules and commitments recognizable as such reasons for action. 19 In the context of legal systems, these constraints supply a fertile ground for the sort of disagreement over institutional norms that may be described as theoretical. An understanding of the logic of institutional power and authority shows that "theoretical" disputes in law are, in the first instance, best understood as controversies over the standards for determining whether the existing legal materials are sufficiently directed at the present 15. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011) (arguing that " [d] isagreements among lawyers about the best interpretation of particular statutes are . . . symptoms of submerged and often unrecognized disagreements about" such deeper and more refined issues as democratic, political, and moral theory).
16. circumstances, and whether they provide a solution to the new matter with sufficient exactness. Accordingly, this article will discuss the logical structure of institutions, with a focus on the "deontic" commitments-i.e., rights, obligations, duties, entitlements, and so forth-that institutions engender, and the "exactness" and "intentionality" constraints on such institutional power. 20 It also invokes the familiar notion of "persuasive authority," albeit from a new angle, to explain how institutions evolve in the face of those constraints. 21 Next this article will discuss the emergence of legal institutions as a vehicle for regulating interactions and transactions. 22 These are the primary units of human social endeavor over which law exercises its institutional authority, regardless of any larger ends that law's regulatory apparatus may be aimed at achieving. Law's institutional constraints must permit the legal system to function as intended, and must ensure that it remain capable of regulating the relevant social transactions. Accordingly, this article will next focus on how understanding institutional structures and constraints may affect our theory of law. 23 Finally this article will demonstrate that the foregoing analysis of institutional logic, as applied to law, best explains the phenomenon in law well-described as theoretical controversy. 24 Rather than pointing primarily to a moral ground for legal validity, controversy in law arises in the first instance when it is uncertain whether existing law has created rights, duties, and obligations with a precision sufficient to inform the new exercise and whether, or in which way, the prior legal materials have been "directed at" the present circumstance. 25 In this regard, theorists have traditionally been too eager to overlook disagreement about whether and how past legal materials and judicial decisions may fit the new situation, and have leapt too readily to the realm of justification. 
A. Searlean Analysis
For several decades, John R. Searle has been an influential philosopher of mind, language, and consciousness. 27 In the 1990s, he linked his thinking in those areas to ideas about the ways in which people organize their interactions and structure society, and has thereby become the leading philosopher of social and institutional reality. 
What Is an Institution?
The theory of intentional states of the mind provides the crossway, in Searle's thesis, from consciousness to social structures. Intentional mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and ordinary intentions, are those that are directed to, and are about, things in the world. 29 These need not be conscious states; I may believe that the Brooklyn Bridge spans the East River even when not thinking about this.
There is also such a thing as collective intentionality. 30 If we are sponsoring a conference on collective intentionality, or about Star Trek, then to that extent, and in that endeavor, we share certain intentional states such as beliefs and ordinary intentions, probably also desires, hopes, and fears. 31 Searle sees limitations in the work of the pioneering philosophers addressing collective intentionality because they have mostly presupposed that collective or "we" intentions are reducible to individual or "I" intentions. 32 Searle argues that collective intentions are "biologically primitive" phenomena not reducible to individual ones: "There is no reason why we cannot have an irreducible we-intention in each of our heads when we are engaging in some cooperative activity." 33 "[S]ocial facts" are collective intentional facts. 34 Even so, these facts are not particularly human. Lions and wolves hunt in packs, birds build a nest together, and ants and bees engage in highly sophisticated group activities.
35 A more complex form of social fact emerges when the group assigns a function to a thing. A branch can be used to perch on. A rock can be used to smash a coconut. But at this level, the object as it physically exists in the world allows it to function in that way, and its intrinsic physical features suffice.
36
Institutional facts are a certain kind of social fact. This uniquely human level of reality begins with the assignment of functions that can be fulfilled by virtue of collective recognition and human cooperation, and not because of an object's intrinsic physical features. Searle's oft-stated example of the assignment of a status function imagines a primitive tribe building a wall around its territory. Over time, the wall erodes and eventually leaves only a line of stones on the ground. Now, however, rather than a wall functioning to keep neighbors out by virtue of its physical characteristics, the larger community collectively recognizes and accepts the boundary symbolized by the line of stones.
39 A normative reality, unique to human culture, has emerged separate and apart from the physicality of the entities involved. 40 Nonhuman animals might be trained not to cross a line, perhaps in response to stimuli and conditioning, 41 but their natural behavior would arise from a disposition, and likely not from the collective acceptance of a norm.
42
The logical structure of the assignment of status functions in human culture is "X counts as Y in context C." 43 Because this assignment does not depend on the brute physical structure of the thing at issue, language is typically the necessary medium by which X may count as Y in context C. 44 The new status exists only by convention, and "words or other symbolic means" permit the community to signify thing X as having meaning and status Y. The social practice might be to treat Sitting Bull as chief, but that symbolic move requires thoughts and language is the vehicle of such thoughts. 45 (1958) (describing "brute" institutional facts as "the facts which held, and in virtue of which, in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which are more 'brute' than the alleged fact answering to that description").
45. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 73 (noting that strictly speaking, any conventional marker will fill this role). Searle's next moves are particularly relevant to our analysis of law as an institutional phenomenon. 47 To advance from private expectations to social structures and the creation and maintenance of institutions, those community members need to declare their status in some way, implicitly or expressly. 48 It is when participants commit themselves in a public way to satisfy expectations, "according to the normative conventions of a language," that they create obligations and other sorts of deontic commitments. 49 Legal and governmental officials take an oath of office, those marrying say "I do," the note in one's hand declares itself legal tender for all debts, and so forth.
Because institutional facts do not flow from the mere physical presence of the objects and entities comprising the institution, is important to distinguish between the deontic and nondeontic areas of the normative landscape. Sometimes we assess behavior as careless, inattentive; but we recognize that even careless and inattentive behavior may provide benefits-and not merely to those who benefit by saving the costs of greater attentiveness or care. Other times, we characterize our conduct in terms of duties and rights, powers and liberties: claims we have against others, authority we have over them, and demands that we can stand or call upon. Roughly, the latter is part of the deontic area of the normative landscape; the former is not, or at least need not be."). But more than collective recognition is required for the institution to function. People must act in reliance upon, and in conformity with, the rights and obligations engendered by the institution. In other words, for non-accidental institutional transactions to occur, there must be not only collective recognition, but also cooperation and a non-reducible collective intentionality.
52
Such transactions are minimally cooperative endeavors at the least, rooted in a collective intention to cooperate, and usually based on a mutual commitment to a common set of rights and obligations sustained by constitutive and regulative institutional rules.
53
Now we have arrived at a fairly robust description of institutional reality. There are a few more things that should be said about the logic of this reality, as Searle has argued it. As shown, 54 an institution must be constituted by rules that permit the individuals, entities, or objects involved to "count as" having a certain significance and status within the institution. A rule creating landlords' rights to evict tenants invests them with a status by which they wield certain powers of eviction, and makes this the case by representing it as being the case. 55 In linguistic terms, the 50. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57. 51. Id. at 57-58. 52. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (explaining that, in order for institutional transactions to successfully occur, collective recognition must be supplemented by some minimal level of cooperation, and the institutional rules be deemed to be reasons for the actors' conduct).
53. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58 (using the example of the institution of money, explaining that whereas the "existence" of this institution may merely require collective recognition, the ability to engage in monetary transactions requires a further level of cooperation).
54. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (explaining the conceptual step taken from assignment to functions, based on the physical attributes of the entity at issue, to the assignment of status functions separate and apart from the physicality of the entities involved).
55. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 97. It is not necessary that individual members of an institutional community subjectively "approve" of the institution or its rules. Even a transaction permeated with fear and loathing depends on a minimum level of cooperative intention. 59 The ability to transact within the institution in all events requires cooperative behavior manifesting the "we" intention characterizing a non-reducible collective intentionality. 60 As a product of the collective recognition and understanding of the rights and obligations generated by status functions, the institution provides participants with reasons for action. 61 The critical and sustaining feature of institutional reasons for action is that these reasons are "desire-independent," separate and apart from what the participants may desire for themselves at that moment, and arising from collective rights, obligations, and duties. 62 The landlord may not want to repair the plumbing, or the tenant may not desire to pay the rent, but mostly they do so. and "intentions-in-action,"-may be of limited usefulness even in the context of Searle's own theory); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 211, 213, 309 ("[T]he institutionality [sic] of law is ultimately grounded in intentions."). This analysis is moored in a view that likens laws to plans, and law to a planning mechanism aimed at settling society's moral disputes. Shapiro's approach thereby appears to stop his car at the corner and has the capability and authority to erect a stop sign there, then A has power over S in that context. Other sorts of intentional content will also come into play, such as the parties' beliefs about driving and road signs, their fears or anxieties about being ticketed by the police, and their hopes concerning safety.
69
Human beings ordinarily exercise power through their speech acts and the typical form of this exercise is the standing directive.
70
So this exercise of power must have an intentional, or propositional content, meaning that the exercise of power must be about, or be directed at, something. 71 The propositional content should convey conditions capable of being satisfied by the institutional actors.
72
Searle describes two relevant constraints on the concept of power that inform the logic of institutional reality. First, the concept of power is logically connected to the concept of the intentional exercise of power-toward what end is the power intended, believed or perhaps desired to be exercised; Searle calls this the "intentionality constraint."
73 "The intentional exercise of power may have unintended consequences," and the intention may sometimes even be unconscious. 74 Perhaps, for example, the crossing guard moves the child on towards school while being conscious only of getting her to the other side of the street. Nevertheless, the crossing guard's authority arises in the context of the institution's collective intention to educate the child.
Notably, intentionality in the ordinary sense of intending a certain outcome is self-referential. If we intend the object in the corner to be a chair, we must think of it as a chair. 75 If one intends to get to Chicago by train, in order for this intention to be satisfied, rely on intentionality as limited to ordinary intentions, those that "take plans as their objects. the intention itself must figure causally in the outcome, here arriving in Chicago by train. 76 The same would not be the case if we simply desired to get to Chicago, without yet intending how to bring this about.
The second constraint on the concept of power is the "exactness constraint." 77 For the institution to function, and for participants to recognize its nature and know what may be expected of them, the intentional content of the power relations upholding the institution-that is, what has been collectively intended and believed to be the case-should be sufficiently specified. 78 Participants in the institution must be capable of knowing, although they need not actually know, what is expected of them, and more generally what status-functions have been assigned.
79
Recall that Searle's formula for constitutive rules is: fact "X counts as status Y in context C." 80 The Y term is not sustained by virtue of the physicality of the object or entity, and so there must be an intersubjective appreciation, and collective acceptance, of the assignment of the status-function. 81 The assignment must be sufficiently specified to permit such collective recognition. 82 It is also a condition of ascribing legitimacy to an exercise of power that one be able to say who holds the power, who is subject to that power, and what is the intended effect of its exercise. 83 If the logic of institutional reality rests on intended outcomes, assigned status functions, collectively-held intentions, and collective recognition or acceptance of the resulting institutional structures, as Searle 84 there will have to be some level of specificity in the intentions and assignments underlying the deontic powers thereby created and sustained. 85 The Finnish moral and social philosopher Raimo Tuomela has articulated a quite Searlean account of social structures. 86 He specifies that several kinds of activities or entities can qualify as a social institution. 87 These include social practices (such as sauna bathing on Saturdays in Finland), objects (such as money), individual properties (such as ownership), linguistic entities (such as natural language), interpersonal states (such as marriage), and social organizations, most of which are typically society-wide, normgoverned group practices.
88 He interestingly adds, however, that 84. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57; cf. id. at 103-04 ("One mark of recognition or acceptance is continued usage of the institution and institutional facts . . . . Acceptance need not take the form of an explicit speech act and can range all the way from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging acquiescence."). Again, while Searle's social ontology is the most influential programme at play in the area of social philosophy, and is enlisted as a foundation for this Article's discussion of controversy in law, each of his contentions may be subject to dispute and interpretation. E.g., George P. 89 This should not mean that all community members will have to be conscious of the norm or practice, or even support these without conflict; it might be the case that a small group of officials specify the norm, rule, or structure, so long as the larger group collectively recognizes the general ethos upon which the officials may act. 90 One further insight by Searle, significant enough to keep in mind, is that higher levels of status functions can be imposed on entities that have previously been assigned status functions. 91 A relatively simple institution can thereby engender a more complex one. Promises, for instance, have status functions because they are collectively recognized as carrying obligations or duties to make good on the promise. 92 But in a certain setting, and at a logically higher level-one, that is, that refers to, incorporates, and contextualizes the deontic force of the promise as such-a promise can create a contract or count as a necessary step toward marriage. 93 More schematically, in the collective intentional assignment of the form, "X counts as Y in context C," the Y term in the simpler institution can become the X term in the more complex one. 94 Stones on the ground may count as a boundary neighbors collectively accept they should not cross in the simpler setting, but iterating upward the boundary may mark off a separate political or quasi-political territory. Or as Searle puts it, an utterance (X1) may count as a promise (Y1) in C1, but under certain circumstances C2, that very promise (X2) counts as a contract (Y2). 95 Now with the contract itself as a context (or Y2 = C3), a particular action as X3 can count as its breach (Y3), and so on.
96

B. The Logical Role of Persuasive Authority
We should now have approximately set out Searle's project.
There is one refinement worth making for the legal theory context, and in respect of institutions generally. This refinement is 97 but not yet the structural factors motivating and legitimizing the evolution of such assignments and institutional change over time. The concept of persuasive authority should provide a fruitful research program in this regard. 98 Searle does not distinguish much between power and authority.
99 This is not to say that he finds them synonymous; rather, authority falls within the range of deontic powers, which for Searle "are rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, privileges, authority and the like." 100 Although Searle does not say more about the discrete nature of authority, he seems to use the term in a familiar way. His sense of "authority" is the one that flows both from and constitutes institutional power, and that is interwoven with duties, rights, and obligations. 101 As one example, an official within an institution will have the authority to perform certain acts.
There is another sense of "authority" that is sometimes complimentary, but not subordinate or tantamount, to institutional deontic power. In this second sense, authority is minimally a linguistic source capable of influencing intentional states, but without imposing obligations. 102 In everyday parlance we speak of the "power to persuade." 103 The two senses of authority may in general be aligned as "practical" and "theoretical," respectively. Much has been written about the effects of the former sort of authority within and upon institutions, particularly law. 105 Theoretical authority, on the other hand, is typically rooted in an expertise, but usually without the intent and ability to impose duties that characterize practical authority. 106 This sort of authority may be an object, perhaps a document, an affair, individual, or entity, always linguistically expressed, that may originate within the institution 107 or that may derive from an "other-institutional" 108 or non-institutional source. Consider, for instance, two books about a national park. One conveys authority in the first sense. It sets out the rules and regulations for use of the park (Searle's "standing directives"), discusses the agency charged with issuing those rules, and cites the statute establishing (by "standing declaration" in Searle's terminology) the agency and the regulatory scheme for the national park. The second book, perhaps issued by an unaffiliated group of "friends of the park," is dedicated to revealing scenic routes that may be taken in the park, the location of its streams and waterfalls, and so forth. 109 The interesting aspect of this example is the search for persuasive authority in the legal context, including the search for authority "in the context of ancestral judicial experience" 109. The book on scenic routes may, of course, have been issued by the agency itself in charge of the park, hence institutionally, and yet, because of its content and intended purpose, does not carry deontic authority. But right now we are interested only in the possibility that the source is extra-institutional.
the non-or other-institutional source of the authority. The institution may incorporate or adopt the authority, perhaps by offering the "friends" book at the park's gift shop, or by recommending it to visitors. In this case, the institution will have changed, to that extent.
Nor is the sort of authority just discussed-that is, of an influential or persuasive source-the same as bare influence. Many extra-institutional factors, including weather conditions, manipulations of a resource, and so on, may exert bare influence over institutions. 110 These will not qualify as persuasive authority. Nor need the "exercise" of influence, a human endeavor, be linguistic, as when someone pulls the lever that may release the flood waters. These sorts of events and efforts, however, also do not qualify as "authority."
But more precisely, the sort of persuasive authority we are concerned with here need not necessarily be theoretical, and need not necessarily embody any expertise. It is, as stated, a linguistic source capable of influencing intentional states, but without imposing obligations. 111 This persuasive authority may comprise a system of background norms or an independently existing institution. Perhaps it is a dress code, for example, or Robert's Rules of Order, systems of norms not adopted by the particular institution at issue. Once adopted, however, those authorities may now be enforced in the context of the adoptive institution.
112
Absent persuasive authority or other outside influence, it would be difficult to explain how institutions evolve. For example, the medieval community may decide, by some accepted procedure, to use squirrel pelt as their form of money; until the group 110. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 62, at 99 (noting that such exertions of influence as manipulation of the money supply will affect "people's reasons for action," but are "not the exercise of normative powers").
111. [Richard] Rose, occurs when domestic policy-makers are dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs; define the problem and mark it as potentially solvable through the adoption of new rules, institutions or policies; look outside their domestic system to an external source identified as a potential model for emulation; form the perception that the external practices, rules or institutions are successful in solving difficulties identical, or at least comparable to those at home; and determine that the external rules are not only technically transferable, but politically acceptable."). 113 This is a trivial point on its own. However, perhaps the institutional criteria for selecting the medium of exchange are portability and intrinsic value, being a medium not too plentiful yet not too scarce.
114 Less than ideal experience with squirrel pelt exchange leads to mammalogical inquiry, 115 and soon the institutional criteria themselves are modified to include durability and divisibility. Extra-institutional persuasive authoritywhich in law may derive either from non-legal sources or from precedents set down in other jurisdictions-has guided institutional evolution.
116
III. THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS As a conceptual matter, people interact prior to, and without the necessity of, a legal system. We will stipulate that when an interaction results in gain or loss, the interaction is a transaction. The set of interactions that are transactions may be equal to or some portion of the full set of interactions. Some would say that the set of transactions is necessarily greater, since perhaps we can effectively transact at a distance without interacting.
117 But here we presuppose that any such transaction suffices to be deemed an interaction, that is, some sort of action or influence upon another that may or may not involve gain or loss. Transacting happens in various ways, both intentionally and accidentally. People injure one another, sometimes intentionally, sometimes accidentally.
118 They make promises, carve out territory and spaces for living and for more transacting, and also plan for lots of things, including death. Something happens between us once and then twice. We become motivated, by our psychology and nature, to structure the next interaction efficiently because the alternative is waste.
119
As transactions, broadly defined to include accidental occurrences, take place in the pre-legal social group-promising, injuring, planning and so forth-they give rise to entitlements, commitments, obligations, and other deontic facts, including deontic emotions such as blame and resentment. 120 Questions inevitably arise about how to organize, coordinate, and prioritize those obligations, resentments, powers, and practiced means to intended ends.
121 Security and liberty interests are at stake and must be balanced. Without a structure for accomplishing these ends, however, the smooth functioning of the group cannot get off the ground or continue. A legal system emerges, which begins with collectively-recognized regulative and constitutive rules.
122 Legal practice arising in the legal system brings with it an argumentative structure and argument about the nature of that argumentative structure. 124 This approach constructively interprets past political decisions and thereby views those decisions in their best light from a moral point of view to determine when collective force is justified. 125 There is a logic to constructive interpretation by which the project manifests in various stages, each involving a "different degree[] of consensus" within the community.
126
Although Dworkin did not speak in terms of the logical structure of his approach, he made it clear that the first stage-the "preinterpretive" stage-was conceptually prior.
127 This is the stage at which we identify the rules and standards, perhaps the statutory words, taken to provide the tentative content of the practice, but at which "a very great degree of consensus is needed." 128 For Dworkin, skepticism about whether a regime resting on little more than the raw data identified at the pre-interpretive stage comprises anything beyond a tentative or minimally "legal" system is justified.
129 That view seems wise. At the same time, Dworkin's pre-interpretive stage generally coincides with what we have just described as the conceptually primary stage characterizing the emergence of a legal system. 130 Dworkin's second, "interpretive," and third, "post-interpretive," stages involve increasing levels of disputation concerning which outcomes best fit and justify the prior materials, and correspondingly lesser degrees of community consensus, and hence the proliferation of theoretical disagreement.
131
If we go a bit further and ask toward what end government coercion would be exercised in the first place, the answer by our model is to regulate transactions, broadly defined, as these reasoning and outcomes that would depend "on the convictions of the judge or panel involved").
124 The definitions of regulative and constitutive rules at least appear to neatly distinguish them. Frederick Schauer explains that constitutive rules are rules that "create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind. They define and thereby constitute activities that could not otherwise even exist." 133 The rules of chess create the possibility of playing chess; they do not, however, make possible the movement of wooden medieval pieces on a checkered board. Regulative rules, on the other hand, are seen as governing antecedently or independently existing behavior and behavioral patterns. 134 In practice, however, rules that may be thought of as constitutive-often, but certainly not always, being procedural-"have their regulative side." 135 Thus, to some significant extent, the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules will be vague. 136 The rules of law are sometimes constitutive of state-enforced rights and obligations. Due process principles, for example, may constitute the procedural fairness that is due to parties facing 132 137 Yet once the legal system, or any other sort of institution, is functional, the constitutive rules "lose their constitutive character within those institutions, serving instead to regulate antecedently defined behavior." 138 As group members interacting-or at least theories about this or the representations the members bring into the interactions-is conceptually prior to their law, so is the community's construction of innumerable rights and obligations, balancing security and liberty interests, conceptually, prior to law's prescriptions. These informal deontic structures evolve into webs of background norms that both influence behavior and empower, subtly or bluntly, coercive responses to violations of those norms. 139 Courts develop their embodied or practical philosophies by determining which rights and obligations law should enforce. These, in turn, dialectically influence the community's norms. 140 The legal system's coercive capability may not be strictly necessary to a concept of law, but "in the world of law as it exists and as it is experienced, coercion is rampant and sanctions are omnipresent." 141 The legal system may create a rule for enforcing promises as follows: "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." 142 In the area of personal injury, members of the group internalize a sense of obligation when its breach gives rise to some level of collective resentment because it violates a governing norm the group may reasonably be expected to infer. 143 144 The legal system may declare that duty in tort is an obligation or set of obligations to adhere to a particular standard of care, which the law recognizes as binding across the community, and for the injurious breach of which the law allows a private remedy. 145 Criminal law, as well as tort, may develop to safeguard the community from freewheeling resorts to the vendetta or blood feud.
146
As the legal system evolves, aiming to fulfill its primary mission of regulating the people's broad range of transactions, it is both the sovereign's unique governing apparatus, and abstractly institutional. The notion that legal systems emerge to regulate transactions is not intended to restrict our view of the range of possible purposes that may drive the emergence or maintenance of a legal system, or of any legal system. The primary engagement between law and its subjects is at the level of the legal system's regulation of their transactions, which are a species of their interactions. 147 Toward which end law regulates these transactions, whether this be social domination and control, dispute resolution, the constructive ordering of norms or morality, or some other aim or combination of aims, poses a different question.
Legal philosophers have not paid much recent attention to law's institutional constraints, which if soundly analyzed should inform their view of law's nature. Searle's original and elegant theory about institutions, whether accepted in whole or in part, should significantly impact this discussion. 148 Thinking about law's institutional nature may, in turn, help refocus our understanding of controversy in law. The answer should be, first, the structural requirements that constrain all institutions, and, second, institution-specific secondary rules that constrain the actions of legal officials. Of these, structural constraints pertaining to all institutions must be prior. Any secondary rule contrary to those constraints would undermine the system's institutional grounding. 149 If the logic of institutions entails that they are constrained by intentionality and exactness conditions, then the same must hold for law. The nature and complexity of legal systems as institutions will diverge dramatically from that of other sorts of institutions. 150 Nevertheless, the strong thesis upholding the new social ontology is that all human institutional reality derives from, and rests on, the assignment of status functions and is constrained by conditions of intentionality and exactness. 151 Those constraints upon institutional power should similarly constrain legal institutional power. This is not necessarily to agree, with thinkers such as Scott Hershovitz, who seeks to transcend the Hart-Dworkin debate, that there is no distinctively legal domain of normativity.
152 However, as suggested earlier, human interactions and transactions, and the range of deontic and normative phenomena which these give rise to, are conceptually prior to the emergence of legal systems. 153 To that extent, the thesis here, like Hershovitz's, may be characterized as "eliminativist [sic] ." 154 149. See generally FULLER, supra note 63, at 39 (demonstrating as a practical matter, for instance, that a secondary rule prohibiting the issuance of any additional rules, precluding the publication of rules which would permit subjects to know what they are "expected to observe," or other secondary rules which would effectively defeat law's intentionality and exactness constraints, would thereby defeat the idea that there is "a legal system at all").
150. It may nevertheless seem to be somewhat of a non sequitur to take the further step, with Dworkin in his wonderful final book Justice for Hedgehogs, of viewing law as a branch of political morality. 155 Hershovitz, however, takes the eliminativist position to "vindicate[] Dworkin's suggestion that people disagree about what the law requires because they disagree about the moral significance of our legal practices."
156 This puts the cart before the horse, for even if law does not generate its own distinctive domain of normativity, nonmoral disagreements rooted in law's institutional nature may best explain-as a conceptual and, perhaps, empirical matter-the widespread nature of theoretical controversy in legal practice.
Again following the general contours of Searle's argument, all institutional reality depends on a basic level of human cooperation, not necessarily for good, and possibly secured by coercion, but rooted in the collective recognition of rights, obligations, duties, and authority, that give subjects desire-independent reasons for action in the institutional context. 157 This collective recognition is the glue that permits observer-relative institutional facts to exist. To sustain the institution, these power relations and commitments must both be intended, or at least be capable of being interpreted as intended, and defined with a sufficient level of exactness.
When a legal case begins, or when a legal issue arises, the first step for the parties or the court is to discern whether the existing legal materials-prior decisions, enactments, and so forth-point the way ahead. If the answer is clearly "yes," law is likely, but certainly not strictly compelled, to accept that outcome and resolve the matter. If not clear, the court will summon some manner of persuasive authority. 158 But either way, the controversy that defines the case will at the outset be characterized by a claim that one outcome or the other is supported by existing institutional facts which are directed at the new situation.
Institutional logic, no less when it comes to legal institutions, demands that the community be capable of recognizing that the case has been presented, that the empowered official or panel has 155 resolved the case, and that, as a result, the party or parties involved must do this or refrain from doing that. Legal officials may systematically conceal the outcome, perhaps by trucking the subject away at midnight to an obscure gulag, but, in that case, the community is capable of recognizing that this sort of "infraction" is tragically handled by means of that sort of exercise of power.
159
In a legal system, officials and participants intend that the parties to a proceeding will leave with a sense that they understand what is next expected of them, or at least that what has occurred is capable of being construed and explained to them in rational discourse. 160 Although this should usually happen, some contingencies will not have been addressed, which may engender contention for future actors in their later case. Alternatively, the future actors may view the prior case as settling certain aspects of the new affair, but not others. The entity charged with interpretation, typically the court, will usually discern a minimal content that has previously been determined with sufficient specificity. 161 Were the parties to a case or controversy to leave the scene without the sense of a certain level of clarity about the rule or norm that has resolved the matter, or that will thereafter govern their interactions, the system would be appropriately criticized as having failed to function in its communications, and more broadly in fulfilling its institutional role of regulating transactions.
162
Although depicting law's institutional constraints as the workings of its internal morality, Lon Fuller famously articulated 159. See generally Sherwin, supra note 7, at 1793. 160. See WILLISTON, supra note 48, at 127-28 ("[T]he law must be applied by men engaged in practical affairs and by so many of them that to be useful a legal doctrine must be capable of being understood and stated by men who are neither profound scholars nor interested in abstract thought."); cf. HABERMAS, supra note 48, at 232-33 ("[T]he legitimacy of legal statutes is determined not only by the rightness of moral judgments but, among other things, by the availability, cogency, relevance and selection of information; by how fruitful such information proves to be; by how appropriately the situation is interpreted and the issue framed.").
161. eight criteria that any legal system must aspire towards: (1) the adoption of general rules that permit the system to avoid merely ad hoc decision making; (2) the publication of those rules such that participants may be capable of knowing what is expected of them; (3) the general prohibition on the abuse of retroactive legislation; (4) the articulation of the rules such as they may be understandable; (5) the coherence of the rules such that the duties they impose are not in conflict with one another; (6) the adoption of rules that the participants are reasonably capable of obeying; (7) the maintenance of a fairly stable set of rules, thereby avoiding frequent and disorienting changes; and (8) a congruence between the rules adopted and the way in which legal officials enforce and administer those rules. 163 Fuller introduced his standards by means of a lengthy allegory, one in which conjured monarch-Rex attempts to create a legal system for his kingdom in ways that successively violate each of the eight principles. 164 At each step, the legal system, as an institution, breaks down, because the kingdom's subjects refuse to collectively accept the legitimacy of the unworkable scheme. As Fuller then announced:
A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.
165
Fuller thereby expressed an existential view of law's minimal institutional constraints. As the legal philosopher Matthew Kramer has already pointed out, however, law-and indeed Fuller's eight precepts engendering law-is as compatible with an evil legal system as with a good one. 166 A respect for individual cognitive autonomy presupposed by the eight precepts, for example, as readily pertains when a bank robber orders his victim to do certain things, because, in that instance, the robber implicitly acknowledges his victim's capacity for rational reflection and 163. See FULLER, supra note 63, at 39. 164. Id. at 33-38. 165. See id. at 39. Fuller's adjectival use of total is important to note, given his further acknowledgment that "the inner morality of law is condemned to remain largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of trusteeship and to the pride of the craftsman." Id. at 43.
166. See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 44, 59-60; see also HART, supra note 3, at 211. 167 Fuller himself qualifies the significance of his desiderata by conceding that, "[w]ith respect to the demands of legality other than promulgation, then, the most we can expect of constitutions and courts is that they save us from the abyss; they cannot be expected to lay out very many compulsory steps toward truly significant accomplishment."
168 Because Fuller's constraints implicate the legal system's ability to survive and persist as an institution, we can adapt them to our institutional approach without accepting the inference he draws to an inner morality for law.
The legal system assigns status functions by promulgating rules and standards to the officials who assume the duty of formulating, administering, or implementing the law in specific and more generalized areas. 169 As with any institution charged with a practical functionality, a legal system would dissipate and be rendered ineffectual were its assignments of rights, duties, and responsibilities to be conveyed in a manner requiring so much interpretation as to render it incapable of guiding the participants' conduct. Rules or standards imparted solely by parable or riddle, for instance, to suggest a scenario at the extreme would be so vague and confusing as to be unworkable and impracticable. 170 For the most part, the meaning of a law, and of the legal duty it imposes, must be capable of being easily understood by those charged with the duty. Community members develop an evaluative attitude and justified expectations that legal officials will adhere to the status functions assigned to them and legal officials, like 167. KRAMER, supra note 4, at 59. 168. FULLER, supra note 63, at 44. Fuller's justification for the promulgation condition somewhat parallels Searle's claims for the institutional exactness constraint. Fuller says the requirement that laws be published "does not rest on any such absurdity as an expectation that the dutiful citizen will sit down and read them all" but rather on the practical conclusion that those who do know the law will by their behavior indirectly influence the others similarly to observe the law. Id. Although Fuller also includes moral language, such that each citizen is "at least entitled to know" the law, even if not individually studying it, he lays out an institutional dynamic by which power is assigned and maintained. Id. at 51.
169. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 85, at 181 ("[C]ompetition between federal and non-federal officials for implementation authority helps insure that federal laws are implemented by officials who are both faithful to the purposes of such laws yet independent from Congress.").
170. Cf. Note, supra note 85, at 407 (arguing that certain "standards laid down by the [Supreme] Court are so vague that they do not offer a workable basis for distinguishing" requirements of the Securities Act of 1933). officials in other institutions, commit themselves in a public way to satisfy those expectations. 171 There are no doubt exceptions, such as when a legislature enacts an abhorrent law, or even when private contractual parties execute an unconscionable agreement, known to offend judicial sensibilities.
172 But in such cases expectations of judicial enforcement may not be justified.
Although Fuller's eight conditions do not necessitate an internal morality for law, they are compelling indicia of the intentionality and exactness constraints that maintain law's institutional power structures and relations. More to the point, these conditions help locate some of the focal points that may engender nonmoral theoretical disagreement over the standards governing those institutional constraints. Participants disagree over whether a ruling may have been general enough to cover their circumstance, whether a rule as published clearly enough supports a litigant's construction, and so forth. Disputes over the standards governing such guideposts, e.g., generality, clarity, understandability, coherence, and capability of being obeyed, are not in the first instance moral ones, and, indeed, legal officials will often have little patience for a detour into moral argumentation about them.
173
Less anecdotally, while non-positivists may deny that Nazi edicts were law, 174 it is not apparent that they would deny the Nazi apparatus to have been an institution. For a regime committed to evil, dispute over institutional constraints qualifying as theoretical would persist by virtue of the system's institutional structures and needs, but could hardly be seen as inevitably grounded in the furtherance of best moral outcomes. If such theoretical dispute over institutional constraints is more easily accepted as a matter of social fact but not morality, this only goes to show that theoretical dispute in law qua institution similarly need not be seen as rooted in moral controversy. 173. E.g., Southard v. Morris, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1913) ("Returning from the digression of moralism, the point urged by counsel for plaintiff is that the precedents all support the view that the question should have been submitted to the jury and counsel have produced landmark decisions in support of his claim.").
174. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 15, at 411-12.
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As shown with regard to institutions generally, law's continuous functioning and maintenance depends on more than collective recognition of the duties and obligations imposed by rules, standards, and other devices for assigning status functions within the legal institution. People upon whom a duty has been imposed, or to whom a power has been conferred, will be unable to fulfill that duty or exercise that power unless the community around them engages in some minimal level of cooperation chaperoned by a collective intentionality (most significantly the group's collective beliefs and ordinary intentions), which accepts the legal rules and principles as reasons for conduct. 175 The citizen will apply for a passport before trying to travel abroad, engage in a certain ritual when making a will, stop at the red light, refrain from fixing prices, and so on. The student may become a lawyer, who may become a judge, at each stage holding a distinctive status and a set of obligations arising by virtue of that status.
The prescriptions followed in these instances will tend toward being sufficiently exact to be capable of being understood, even if sometimes on the basis of the retained expertise of others more qualified. But what also must be understood is the fact itself of collective acceptance. It would not be enough for Ms. Jones to follow a rule believing it to be meant only for her. She should understand that others similarly situated are not adhering to divergent rules or generally following practices that may be at crosspurposes with her own, but are engaged in the same overall enterprise.
176
This is not to say that the rules and standards in a legal system must serve the ends of equality or fairness. Laws may be sufficiently clear and exact to guide community members in achieving oppressive inequality or unfair domination and deprivation, and these may be a legal system's intentional objectives. 177 But even under this scenario, the precision of the power relations specified by the rules permits subjects to know and obey the laws, which are 175. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58. 176. See generally Raz, Introduction, supra note 121, at 10 ("I should recognize that other people are in my position and that if we all adopt a coordinating practice to follow the directives of a certain body within certain limits then we will all be able to establish and preserve justified coordinative practices which would otherwise evade our grasp.").
177. See Hart, supra note 14, at 616 (calling the Nazi legal system "a Hell created on earth for men by other men").
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Nor should the idea of a fairly equal assignment of rights and imposition of duties across the community rule out non-general, particularized expressions of law. In other words, an important aspect of the legal system is its flexibility in addressing localized or particular matters.
179 A town's zoning board, for instance, is charged with weighing several factors in deciding whether to grant Philippe Ifrah a variance to subdivide her property. 180 What is assumed by the larger community, however, is that each citizen-or at least each similarly situated (and similarly empowered) citizenwould receive fairly equal treatment, the same factors being balanced, were they to apply for such a variance.
It should be noted that George Fletcher has offered an interesting objection to the notion that the constitutive rules by which law assigns status functions "must find support in the attitudes of those for whom the institutional fact resonates as true." 181 Fletcher, who has therein offered one of the few responses thus far to Searle's institutional philosophy as it may pertain to law, responds that it is validity, rather than social acceptance, which functions as the chief criterion of a law's "having force."
182 Laws are deemed binding, in other words, not necessarily because they are widely accepted by the society, but rather because they have been validly enacted. As an example, Fletcher refers to the case of gay and lesbian marriages, which might hypothetically be recognized as "legal" by various legislatures, but which may at the same time not be "accepted" by society except in a narrow "technical" sense.
183
Being the prime mover behind a fairly original area of philosophical thought, Searle himself has acknowledged that his theory of institutions is nascent and will need to be ironed out. 184 Even so, it appears that the present theory is powerful enough to afford significant insight into controversy over the concept of legal validity, based on the idea that the assignment of status functions requires collective recognition and acceptance to work. First, Searle points out that "acceptance" need not imply approval, but rather, may occur along a continuum beginning with a very weak grudging acknowledgment of the assignment. 185 In other words, the sort of collective recognition and acceptance discussed throughout this article should not be construed to imply endorsement. The level of acceptance of non-heterosexual marriage that Fletcher labels "technical" should, at the least, rise to the level of acknowledgment, however grudging, that such marriages have been deemed "legal" in the relevant jurisdictions, that such marriages are thenceforth "entitled," at least within the existing legal system to the same legal benefits as heterosexual ones, and that the political and legislative mechanisms, themselves accepted by the society, have acted validly.
Second, and rooted in the logic of institutional power structures, the legal validity of the legislation provides community members with "desire-independent" reasons for action, namely, a recognition of the marriages and their now legal trappings. These desire-independent reasons function precisely because they may run counter to, or serve to exclude, what the participants may believe to be right or may desire for themselves. 186 They will understand that the declaration of certain words in a certain context, on the part of a same-sex couple, now counts as assigning to that couple the status of being married. Although the odd baker may refuse to take a wedding cake order from a gay couple, or the odd county clerk to stamp marriage licenses, 187 even they may grudgingly acknowledge their legal obligation to do so absent a further exemption granted-at least in the interim until subjected to constitutional review-by their legislature.
V. LAW'S WIDESPREAD "THEORETICAL" DISPUTES ARE NONMORAL CONTROVERSIES ABOUT EXACTNESS AND COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
We might initially protest that, although by any definition the legal system certainly qualifies as an institution or set of institutions, it hardly seems clear that there is much exactness or expression of "collective" beliefs and intentions involved in legislation and judicial decision-making. 189 How will it make sense, therefore, to apply the exactness and intentionality constraints to an analysis of law? And if these constraints are included in the analysis, how will we not end up diluting our concept of law of its peculiar institutional character?
We would, for instance, call the well-worn rule vehicles are prohibited in the park a "law" when adopted by the appropriate lawmaking body. But this does not mean that the rule manifests official intentions and beliefs to sufficiently convey legal duties and obligations in a particular case. The rule is exact in a sense, but fairly imprecise when one considers bicycles, roller skates, or ambulances responding to an emergency.
190
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the inherent inexactness of language-and therefore of declarations, rules and laws-should actually support, far more than it may tend to refute, a Searlean institutional explanation of legal phenomena central to the long debate over law's nature. Specifically, the institutional pull within law toward compliance with the intentionality and exactness constraints provides an interesting explanation of the argumentative structure of legal practice. Moreover, this reason may be more accessible, and ultimately more fitting, than Dworkin's because it need not rely upon a structure "hidden" beneath the surface of legal decision making. 191 Rather, the will to comply with institutional constraints upon the creation and exercise of deontic power should be fairly well apparent on the surface of judicial decisions.
Dworkin viewed controversy in law as rooted in dispute over moral content, with judges seeking to determine which legal-or moral hence legal-principle best fits the conflict at hand and justifies the new outcome. 192 Constructive interpretation rejects the idea of an "existing law" in which there will be a distinct collection of legal rules, principles, and other standards. 193 In a Dworkinian world, the right answer to legal cases should follow from our best interpretation of the data at hand, applying a principled consistency over time, using the soundest principles and standards of theory construction drawn from society's political morality. 194 This is, for Dworkin, the hidden structure of legal argumentation, which engenders widespread theoretical disagreement in pursuit not only of justice and fairness, but integrity. 195 A precedent carries a "gravitational force" that "escapes the language of its opinion." 196 It is at Dworkin's second, "interpretive" stage, in the process of justifying the practice and placing law's existing materials in their best light, and then also at the fairly marginal third, "post-interpretive" or "reforming" stage of the constructive interpretive exercise-at which interpreters finetune their sense of what the legal practice "really" requires so as to best serve the moral justification located at the second stage-that consensus becomes far less likely and theoretical disagreement may abound.
197
The theory of adjudication that views the "gravitational"-and deontic-force of institutionally binding determinations as "escaping" or being "hidden" from the language of those decisions appears to stand in quite some contrast to Searle's view of the logic of institutions. Recall that, for Searle, constitutive rules that construct the institution consist in speech acts known as "standing
It is by virtue of those declarations that institutions permit the individuals, entities, or objects involved to "count as" having a certain significance and status within the institution. At the same time, regulative rules that govern behavior within the institution are known, in linguistic terms, as "standing
This is not to say that institutional rules do not have "gravitational force" that transcends the language used to frame them or that they do not require constant interpretation. The point, however, is that the linguistic expression is primary. When an institution assigns power, it intends to communicate, and thereby needs to be fairly clear and precise lest the assignment be futile and incapable of collective recognition. Determining what sort of deontic power the declaration assigns is conceptually prior to an interpretation that may "escape" the language.
Like other speakers, courts and legislatures rely on linguistic conventions to convey meaning in an efficient and repeatable manner. 200 In the institutional setting, the question is what power the declaration or declaring entity intends and believes itself to assign-whether a positive power, such as a right, or a negative power, such as a duty or obligation-and with what level of exactness that assignment has been made. Language functions in 197. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66-67, 230-31 (setting out his theory of the three stages by which law is constructively interpreted).
198 the institutional setting to constitute, as well as describe, the obligation, right, or duty intended to be assigned.
201
When citizens want to learn what legal right or duty they may have in a situation, they look to the statutory and regulatory materials, writings, sanctions, or permissions that the law will enforce, as well as any legal decisions that bear on the issue. Legal officials do the same when trying to figure out how to treat a case. By looking for authorities that bear on the issue, these participants seek out the data most exactly to the point. If the authority appears close enough to be decisive, the work in most cases is done. As Justice Roger Traynor put it:
[A] judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point; he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral judicial experience: the given decisions or, lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in the context of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but always unbroken line with the past. A judge is constrained not only to heed the relevant judicial past in arriving at a decision, but also to arrive at it within as straight and narrow a path as possible.
202
There should be an intuitive consensus about Trainor's view of the judge's duty. Few would disagree that the court's deliberation, even when not bound by a controlling precedent, is constrained by standards. 203 The path, as straight and narrow as possible, "establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the future;" 204 but the question remains whether this is accomplished owing to the moral content of law's embedded standards and principles, or by way of judicial discretion which creates the new precedent as an expression of the court's evolving practical philosophy about what the law, and self-referentially the institution, should be. Dworkin said that the argumentative structure of legal practice, which involves theoretical disagreement "about the soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial practice," 205 counts in favor of the non-positivist construction that asserts law's moral ground. This article presupposes theoretical disagreement, but contends that the conceptually prior disagreement that happens in a theoretical and widespread way is a dispute over standards of exactness and intentionality. The controversy is thereby, in the first instance, over the social fact of whether, gauged by those standards, the given law and decisions yield the outcome.
The non-positivist claim has always presupposed that theoretical disagreement in law rests on personal and political morality, and "usually raises moral issues." 206 For Dworkin, theoretical disagreement wrestles over the correct way to interpret the data or practice before the court, an exercise grounded on the moral quest to make legal practice the best social practice it can be. 207 Even in Dworkinian terms, however, theoretical disagreement is not necessarily grounded in morality. For this, unadorned, is a controversy "about the grounds of law, about which other kinds of propositions, when true, make a particular proposition of law true." 208 Paraphrasing, the parties to a dispute will be engaged in a Dworkinian theoretical disagreement when they disagree about what must occur in the legal system before a proposition of law can be said to be true. 209 And even for Dworkin, an interpretation may justify because it fits, and therefore "the distinction between the two dimensions is less crucial or profound than it might seem." 210 The question of fit alone should be an area of substantial disagreement. 211 At one extreme, dissents in legal decisions sometimes charge that the majority has ignored a controlling precedent and the majority may say the same about the dissenting view. 212 In the usual and ubiquitous practice, though, the debate is whether or to what extent the precedents cited by the adversary are distinguishable from the case before the court. 213 Doctrines are also parsed and distinguished. 214 Before the new dispute arises, existing legal sources-whether they be as general as a statute or judicial holding, or as individualized as a zoning variance or contract-define the status functions that constitute legal relations and regulate society.
The non-positivist view has taken theoretical disagreement to be fairly lofty, involving dispute that goes to the core of political morality. If, however, legal controversy comes down to the widespread jockeying over standards of exactness and intentionality, including issues such as ambiguity and distinguishability, then theoretical disagreement is rather quotidian. But that is quite the point: theoretical disagreement is recurrent, hence quotidian. Yet positivists have acquiesced in the grander view and have thereby engaged in responding to the "powerful" challenge. 215 Hart came to believe that "soft" or inclusive positivism, by which the identification of law may sometimes depend upon moral criteria and the "open texture" of language which renders law incomplete in hard cases, are the vehicles by which to answer Dworkin's claim of theoretical disagreement in law. 216 The problem, however, is to account for theoretical disagreement that not only occurs in law, but that is widespread. Hart was conceptually deterred from acknowledging any such widespread controversy owing to his theoretical commitment to law's certaintyproviding function. While not "paramount and overriding," the certainty-providing function of the rule of recognition presupposed, for Hart, some limit on the degree of uncertainty that a society could tolerate. 217 What should be considered, however, is the disconnect between legal philosophy-wherein the philosopher wrangles over the concept of legal validity-and the practice it interprets. 218 Ubiquitous tension in litigated cases over standards of exactness and intentionality explains the appearance of widespread theoretical disagreement from a nonmoral perspective. The legal norms set out in the prior case may or may not apply in the present one, with its dissimilar (in varying degrees) factual context. This uncertainty has been taken to result from an inherent vagueness in the language used and now needing to be "precisified [sic]" for application in the new context. 219 In other respects, however, it is widespread stability and the lack of biting controversy rooted in political morality that characterizes legal systems. Were the implications of a substantial portion of institutional norms to be indeterminate, then the institution's status would itself be fledgling or doubtful-an arrangement striving to be a legal system. 220 The view, however, that law's argumentative structure engenders nonmoral disagreementarising from controversy over the standards governing the intentionality and exactness constraints-should align with Hart's insight that, while the existence of law is relatively certain, law's application in particular cases may be significantly controversial. 221 The present view may also benefit the Dworkinian approach to some extent, by tamping down if not resolving an irksome paradox. In Dworkin's interpretive model, legal principles are identified in the exercise in which they are set forth to justify the legal practice.
222 Yet, the interpretive exercise seeking principles that fit the prior practice is epistemically prior. Principles must both fit and justify the legal practice at the second stage, and then, at the third, be fine-tuned based on the interpreter's best substantive convictions about the practice and the principles identified at the In the Dworkinian scheme we are more knowledgeable, and there is less controversy, about principles identified as fitting the practice and then we are left to ask more controversially whether the principles justify the practice. If, however, legal principles can only be demarcated at the latter stage involving justification, how can these be known to us at the epistemically prior interpretive stage gauging fit?
Rooting much of legal controversy in disagreement over standards of exactness and intentionality relocates the ground of theoretical disagreement to the interpretive exercise in which principles are measured for fit. This case must be decided and its degree of difference from the prior case becomes the focus of dispute. Each participant-whether an official or a litigant-asks whether the existing legal data, with its embedded norms, support her own interpretation with sufficient intention and specificity. 224 Remaining open to the inevitable claim that existing legal materials are "distinguishable," the court implicitly acknowledges that its decision making may cover greater terrain than provided by the given materials.
Engaging in this exercise by deciding which rights and duties have been intended or sufficiently specified, or alternatively which the law should assign, judges reflectively engage in the development of their practical philosophy concerning the court's institutional role. Developing their practical philosophy, judges do not passively receive societal norms but actively participate in norm elaboration. 225 Portions of prior decisions not necessary to the holding, and thereby not contained within the holding's intentional contents, are dismissed as "obiter dicta," 226 and dicta becomes law if later adopted. 227 223. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 228. 224. E.g., Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376, 378-79 (N.Y. 1998) (disagreeing over whether, by the language and purpose of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and its legislative history, Congress intended to preempt state common law claims for injuries arising from the lack of a driver'sside air bag).
225. See Diver, supra note 123, at 1441 (discussing suggestions by Christopher F. Edley, Jr., "on how a reviewing court would go about elaborating norms of sound governance and how the judiciary could be better equipped, by training and expert assistance, for the demands of such a challenging assignment").
226. The legal system necessarily wields power, but fulfillment of the epistemic exactness constraint is requisite to the attribution of power. When the legal system adopts the rule vehicles prohibited in the park, one side may argue that the exactness constraint has not been satisfied when it comes to a certain thing. The claim that law's power has not reached the use of that thing is, in effect, a claim that the thing does not exist within the rule's collective intentional content. Not, that is, until sufficiently precise social facts exist by which citizens may be able to delimit vehicle in the desired way.
Secondary rules, and in particular "rules of change," 228 give the procedure for changing the law. A statute of wills, for instance, might be seen as a rule of change from the statutory default distribution of property should a person die intestate. 229 Nearly by definition then, the content of the testator's choice of whom to favor in his will results from extralegal considerations, whether this is persuasive authority or, more likely, the nonlinguistic influence of personal affections.
Persuasive authority runs the gamut, from the opinions of coequal courts to legislative histories to legal treatises to Aristotle. 230 A great source of the compelling nature of Dworkin's view is that, indeed, courts will hold out their reliance upon persuasive authority to be a legal, as opposed to extralegal, exercise. In the classic case of Sherwood v. Walker, 231 for instance, Hiram Walker agreed to sell his cow, Rose 2d of Aberlone, to the banker, T. C. Sherwood, both parties falsely believing Rose was barren. 232 Said the court:
This question as to the passing of title is fraught with difficulties, and not always easy of solution. An examination of the multitude of cases bearing upon this subject, with their infinite variety of facts, and at least apparent conflict of law, ofttimes [sic] tends to confuse rather than to enlighten the mind of the inquirer. It is best, therefore, to consider always, in cases of this kind, However, the Sherwood court then disregarded existing legal principles as applied to horses and opted for a new legal rule channeling Aristotle's Categories. 234 The dissenting opinion agreed with the Aristotelian language, but insisted that prior authority "clearly sustains the views I have taken." 235 This was a controversy over the standards inhering in the legal system's institutional exactness and intentionality constraints.
The primary controversy in Sherwood was whether law about horse trading was sufficiently "directed at" cow bargaining. It was also about whether prior law concerning a mutual mistake over the soundness of a horse was sufficiently directed at larger situations reaching mutual mistakes over bovine fertility. These issues suggest disagreement rooted in the intentionality constraint.
236
The controversy might also be seen as stemming from disagreement over whether the existing law covered the present situation with sufficient exactness. The practitioner's first question in Sherwood was whether there had been a sufficiently precise assignment of Walker's right to rescind, Sherwood's obligation to replevy, or his entitlement to walk away with unexpected profit in hand. 237 Exactness and intentionality disputes reveal the conceptually prior layer of controversy, and account for the argumentative structure of legal practice. The controversy arises when one side claims that a precedent covers the new kind of circumstance, while the other side deems the new situation to be of an unprecedented kind; this disagreement typically boils down to competing litigation stances in which one side defines the kind broadly enough to 233 . Id. at 921. 234. Id. at 923 (fashioning a rule using the terms "substance," "quality," and "accident" derived from Aristotle's Categories 3b10 
243
A constructive interpreter may ask which outcome is morally best but, apart from questions of competence, this is not the practitioner's priority. The existing law, as communicated in the legal materials, might have successfully assigned rights and obligations, such that the parties and legal officials are able collectively to recognize the content of this assignment of positive and negative powers. 244 The idea of this sort of success is a loose one, and a matter of degree, hinging on whether the current matter is resolved because the current participants consider themselves to be grasping, and covered by, the intentions expressed in the earlier determination. If so, the parties and officials are under the sway of desire-independent institutional reasons to act. If not, or occasionally because it seems time for a change, they turn to the complex network of persuasive authority derived from moral reasoning and other sources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent social and institutional philosophy affords us new analytic tools for assessing the logic and dynamics of institutions. Applying this new thinking to legal philosophy sheds further light on how we can move the latter project beyond the well-rehearsed parameters of the Hart-Dworkin debate. Efforts to do so in the past few years have been compelling, but are subject to challenge. This free to disregard established precedent"); Lowery v. Haithcock, 79 S.E.2d 204, 208-09 (N.C. 1953) ("Our former decisions have liberalized the lien statute upon which plaintiff relies-perhaps beyond the original intent. Even so, we must apply the statute as heretofore construed by this Court.").
243. Although case precedents afford a legal system a mobile and efficient means of assigning status functions and of adjusting prior assignments and functions, this article is ultimately neutral with regard to a theory of judicial precedent. Its thesis is consistent with the idea that there may be a legal system in which officials are assigned status functions obligating them to disregard or devalue prior case decisions, and thereby not to treat those individual decisions as carrying status-function-assignment functions. 
